Download the PHP package nurbekjummayev/laravel-media-api without Composer

nurbekjummayev/laravel-media-api

Standalone media/file upload API for Laravel. Upload once, get an id, then each model links it from its own table. Private storage with temporary signed-URL access and automatic orphan cleanup. Built with spatie/laravel-package-tools.

Requirements

• PHP ^8.3
• Laravel 12 or 13

Install

Files are stored under media/private and media/public (project root). Publish config if needed:

API

Upload accepts files[] (+ optional type=public|private) and returns Media[] with id, uuid, and a temporary signed url. Newly uploaded media are attached=false.

Uploads are atomic — the whole request runs in a DB transaction. If any file fails to write to disk or its Media record can't be saved, the transaction rolls back and every file already written for that request is removed, so no orphan files are left behind.

view/download are protected by Laravel temporary signed URLs (validated against APP_KEY, expire after config('media.url_ttl')). Read the signed view URL from $media->url and the download URL from $media->downloadUrl() — never hand-build these URLs. Inline view responses also send X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and a sandbox CSP so SVG/HTML files can't execute scripts.

Linking media — each model owns its link

There is no shared polymorphic pivot. A model that needs media defines its own table/column.

Many files — a dedicated per-model table (e.g. product_photos):

Single file — an FK column on the model:

Auto-marking attached (recommended)

Use the InteractsWithMedia trait so linking flips attached=true automatically:

Without the trait, call app(MediaService::class)->markAttached($ids) yourself after linking.

Cascading delete

When a model using the trait is deleted, its media is cleaned up automatically: FK-column media (mediaColumns()) and pivot media (mediaRelations()) are deleted and the pivot links detached.

The physical file is only removed after the surrounding DB transaction commits (DB::afterCommit) — so if the delete is wrapped in a transaction that rolls back, the model, the media row, and the file all survive. The same guarantee applies to MediaService::delete() and the DELETE endpoint. With no active transaction the file is removed immediately.

For soft-deletable parents the deleting event also fires on soft delete, so media is removed then too. Override mediaColumns()/mediaRelations() (or hook forceDeleted yourself) if you need to keep media until a hard delete.

Orphan cleanup

Newly uploaded media are attached=false. Linking flips them to attached=true (via the trait above or MediaService::markAttached($ids)). The scheduled media:purge command (daily) deletes unattached media older than config('media.purge_after_hours') (24h) from disk + DB:

Always call markAttached after linking, otherwise the file is purged.

Owner

Each Media row stores an owner_id (set to the authenticated user on upload). The owner relation resolves to config('media.owner_model') — set it to User::class or any other model; null falls back to config('auth.providers.users.model').

Each upload also records the request ip and user_agent.

Security

Upload handling is hardened against the usual file-upload attacks:

• Content-based type checks. Validation uses Laravel's mimes rule, which inspects the file's real content via finfo (plus Laravel's built-in PHP-upload block) — renaming shell.php to avatar.jpg fails because the content is detected as PHP/HTML, not an image. The stored mime is the server-detected type, never the client-supplied Content-Type.
• Extension allow/deny list, checked twice. StoreMediaRequest rejects any blocked extension found in all parts of the filename (so shell.php.jpg is caught) and in the content-guessed extension. MediaService::store() re-checks the extension against the allow/deny list before writing to disk, so even direct (non-HTTP) calls can't drop a .php/.phtml/.htaccess/.exe onto a disk.
• No client-controlled paths or names. Files are stored under Y/m/d/<uuid>.<ext> — the on-disk name is always a random UUID with a sanitised ([a-z0-9]) extension. The original filename is kept only as a display name, with directory parts and control characters (incl. CR/LF, preventing Content-Disposition header injection) stripped.
• Private files are sandboxed on the way out. view responses send X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and a sandbox CSP, so an SVG/HTML file opened directly can't run scripts.
• Active content is blocked on the public disk. Public files are served straight by the web server (no controller, so no CSP can be added). Extensions in public_blocked_extensions (SVG, XML, …) are therefore refused for type=public uploads, closing the stored-XSS hole; they remain allowed on the private disk where they're sandboxed.

Deployment note: as defence-in-depth, configure your web server to not execute scripts (PHP, CGI) under the media/ directories. The package never stores executable extensions, but disabling execution there removes the risk entirely even under misconfiguration.

Config

See config/media.php: owner_model, disks, allowed/blocked extensions, public_blocked_extensions, max size, signed-URL TTL (url_ttl), purge window, route prefix/middleware, and per-action upload_middleware/delete_middleware (the can:* permission checks are pulled from here, so you can rename permissions or add throttling without touching the package).

Testing

The package is tested with Pest on top of orchestra/testbench (no full Laravel app needed). CI runs the suite on PHP 8.3/8.4 against Laravel 12.